The Image of the Institution

A Cognitive Theory of Institutional Change

Michael Neuman

How are institutions born? How do they evolve? Can they die, do they fade away, or are they destined to bloat and muddle through? These fundamental questions of institutional theory and institutional change are at the core of politics, sociology, and urban planning, which, in part, can be seen as an applied field of the former two. Yet urban planning is more: It is an art, a science, and a field of design. Planning’s virtues include crafting images for a better future. This feature endows urban planning and design with cognitive characteristics that fill gaps in current understandings of institutions and of planning. It also suggests that a key facet of city planning is designing and managing organizations and institutions of governance. Metropolitan spatial planning, a specific practice of urban planning, is a fertile field in which to empirically analyze these matters.

This article reports on the evolution of metropolitan planning in Madrid from 1910 to 1995. Some important aspects of planning have changed over this period, while others have remained almost unaltered. The tension between forces supporting continuity and forces struggling for change provided an animating dialectic that helps explain the evolution of planning and its institutions in the capital of Spain. This dialectic of continuity and change is inherent in the nature of urban planning, and it has important implications for planning practice and scholarship (Neuman & Gavinha, 2005).

Every 20 years since 1910, Madrid has undergone a planning cycle in which an urban plan was prepared, adopted by law, and implemented by a new institution. This preparation-adoptions-implementation sequence, along with the institution’s structures and processes, has persisted, despite frequent upheavals in society. These upheavals included revolutions, civil wars, and regime changes among dictatorship, monarchy, and democracy. The planning

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About the author:
Michael Neuman (m.neuman@unsw.edu.au) is Professor of Sustainable Urbanism at the University of New South Wales. Recent books include The Imaginative Institution: Planning and Governance in Madrid (2010) and The Futures of the City Region (2011), with Angela Hull.

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institution itself played a lead role in maintaining this continuity. Why and how was this the case?

My findings show that Madrid’s planners invented new images for the city and its metro region. Their images of place were social constructs that were elaborated in planning processes. At the same time, image making was a tool that savvy planners used to coordinate those very planning and urban policy processes, as well as their implementation. In a complex, fragmented institutional setting in which scores of organizations and interest groups competed in overlapping policy arenas, images were a cohesive force around which plans, policies, and investments were shaped.

Planners in Madrid also used their images to build new governance institutions, or to reform existing ones. Images began as urban designs, growth management plans, or even as metaphors capturing a new vision. One such metaphor was *Recuperar Madrid* (Recover Madrid). Political regimes deployed their principles and beliefs into governing institutions via these images and metaphors. Images went a long way in constituting and giving important meaning to new institutions and thus helped attain planning goals. Once the planners recognized that planning and its governance had a lifecycle related to the economic and political cycles of the metropolis, and that the governing institutions did as well, they were able to extract principles of urban, regional, and institutional design to better accomplish their tasks. They realized that without supportive institutions and politicians, even their best plans would gather dust.

This analysis contributes to several theories. One is of institutional change and evolution, and its application in the realm of institutional design. It contributes by identifying the roles of both internal (mental) and external (e.g., maps, plans) images in institutional change; thus, it is a cognitive theory. It also contributes to institutional theory by addressing the complete lifecycle of institutions, from birth through reform and decline, to death or rebirth. This research contributes to planning theory by identifying the key role of the city plan image in effective planning and governance, and the role of city planning as institutional design.

I begin with two literature reviews designed to orient the reader who may be unfamiliar with institutional theory and recent planning theory. The first review focuses on institutions in general; the second focuses on planning institutions in particular. The institutional literature is specific, pinpointing institutional evolution and change. The planning literature is targeted as well, to recent work on planning institutions, especially those in Europe. The article proceeds with a new theory of institutional change, which posits a constitutional image at the heart of the institution and a lifecycle typology of institutional evolution. Understanding the current debates in the literatures is crucial for the new theory presented here. Next, I test the theory, using mini case studies of four episodes of planning in Madrid, Spain that span the 20th century. An analysis of the empirical data yields specific findings that highlight the crafting of the image of the city in the plan-led processes of institutional change. This confirms planning’s key role in institutional design.

**Scholarship on Institutional Change and Evolution**

Talcott Parsons (1999) concluded “Prolegomena to a Theory of Social Institutions” with the plea that “the theory of social institutions must be concerned with the dynamics of institutional change” (p. 333). One of the two fundamental problems he associated with institutional change was structural change, which is “concerned with the process by which existing value systems change and new elements come in” (p. 333). These concepts are central to the questions investigated in this research.

A complete theory of institutional dynamics needs to consider the entire lifecycle of the institution and the mode of institutional development and change throughout the lifecycle. Only a few researchers have attempted to portray a (truncated) institutional lifecycle (see Hollis & Sweetman, 2001; Leblebici, Salancik, Copay, & King, 1991; March & Olsen, 1989), or a general scheme of institutional evolution, which earned Douglass North the Nobel Prize (North, 1990). Analyses of institutions are most commonly short term and episodic.

One type of institutional development is structuration: incremental evolution from the ground up (Giddens, 1984). Recursive behavior patterns inscribe meaning and substance into enduring institutions. Day-to-day activities become habits and routines imbued with commitment and value. A gradual replacement of old mores with new ones structures the institution. In turn, institutions encode and imprint their own meanings and behaviors on individuals, reflecting the reciprocal duality of institutional ontology. In this mode of institutional development, individual agent behavior is aggregated in iterative and cumulative processes. The institution is an emergent outcome of their actions. There is no force intentionally designing the institution. In this manner, a new institution may be created almost without our being aware of it, so gradual can the acceptance of new behavior patterns be. This is the position Knight (1992) suggested. Berger and Luckmann (1966) call this gradual process social construction.
At the other end of the spectrum is revolution and radical change. Societal unrest ushers in a new institution while toppling the old. In between revolution and structuration, we find incremental approaches combining routine maintenance and planned change. My research highlights another category in this middle range: institutional design. The creation of an institution from scratch and the reform and redesign of an existing one follows a design approach, constituting it with members, structures, processes, and content. The premise of institutional design is to construct a broad framework to govern aspects of society based on a priori notions and assumptions, including norms and values (Knight, 1992).

Institutions can also form in other ways. One is by fiat. A law, constitution, or decree creates a new institution “from above.” Or it may be created “from below,” that is, by social movement, with the masses imposing a new social order. Another path to institution formation is self-organization, whereby a confluence of factors results in the coalescing of forces around a leader who carries an idea, image, or metaphor that embodies a new spirit. Nobel Prize winner Elinor Ostrom (1990) highlighted the incremental, self-transforming nature of institutional change in common pool resource management institutions. Other social scientists researched self-organization, taking cues from natural sciences, particularly biology, chaos, and complexity. Knight and Ostrom countered some institutionalists’ use of evolutionary accounts in biology with rational choice in economics.

Some institutions are built around innovative policy-making processes, including growth management (Gualini, 2001; Healey, Khakee, Motte, & Needham, 1997; Innes & Booher, 2010; Ostrom, 1990). These new institutions are the trenches in the battleground of democracy, and citizens turn to them when faced with politics as usual, that is, representative politics, special interests, negative campaigning, and the like. As voters increasingly turn away from the voting booths and the idea of representative democracy, there has been an increase in direct participation (de Souza Briggs, 2008; Heinett & Kübler, 2009; Heinett, Sweeting, & Getimis, 2009; Salet, Thornley, & Kreukels, 2003). Sharing information and decisions collaboratively lessens the chance of errors in fact and judgment (Dyer, Anders, Helbing, Couzin, & Krause, 2009). One outcome of increased participation, the flurry of committees, commissions, panels, and other groups, enlarges the arenas and forums of metropolitan planning. This complicates matters for metro areas that struggle to gain control of their destinies in the absence of coherent and unitary entities endowed with sufficient political, legal, and financial resources.

What distinguishes an institution from a mere organization, or system of organizations, are its persistence over time and extension through space (Giddens, 1984), its history of affiliation among its members (Castles, 1989; Steinmo, Thelen, & Longstreth, 1992), and its embedded norms, which are manifested in common practices and traditions (Bellah, Madsen, Sullivan, Swidler, & Tipton, 1991). An institution is more than an organization that is transformed by leadership that shapes its values and then projects and protects these values inside and outside of the organization, as Selznick (1957) believed.

With this background, we can venture a definition of institution. At its most basic, an institution orders social behavior according to accepted norms. An official institution is established by constitution or charter, by law or decree. An institution has members governed by its codes. An institution has structures (networks of organization) and processes (laws, regulations, procedures, codes, customs, and traditions) that evolve in a reciprocal relationship over time. Anthony Giddens (1984) has called this “structuration.” To structures and processes we add content, which expresses the meaning of an institution, and the values its members espouse. An institution extends these core values through space and time via its structures, processes, and content.

Norms that express values are at the heart of all institutions. Following Walter Lippmann and John Dewey, Bellah and colleagues (1991) affirmed that “institutions are normative patterns imbedded in and enforced by laws and mores (informal customs and practices),” and that “institutions always have moral elements” (pp. 10–11). Norms are deeply and often implicitly sewn into the institution’s fabric. Huntington (1968) expressed the same sentiment: “Political institutions have moral as well as structural dimensions” (p. 24).

This brief review suggests that while structures and processes are well understood, content is not, and is thus a gap in knowledge. This is especially noteworthy regarding images, and it points to another gap in the literature on institutions: their cognitive dimension.

Recent Scholarship on Planning Institutions

How do we make coherent plans in an incoherent institutional setting? This kind of setting fairly overwhelms our ability to deal with urban problems confronting cities. The contours of the political and policy aspects of this debate, as they relate to the United States, were discussed in Downs (2005). The lack of effective intergovernmental...
coordination for spatial planning and growth management was frequently cited (Albrechts, Alden, & de Rosa Pires, 2001; Alexander, 1993; Healey, 2010; Innes & Booher, 2010; Innes, Gruber, Neuman, & Thompson, 1994; Neuman & Hull, 2009). Nonetheless, O’Connell (2009) found that the more interest groups were involved in growth management, the more likely initiatives were to gain critical political support, despite the attendant coordination problems. As early as 1912, planning pioneer Patrick Abercrombie (1912) signaled the “necessity for cooperation” in planning metropolitan areas (p. 261).

The scope and scale of the institution of planning lies between broad social arrangements, such as markets and government, and a single organization, such as a municipal planning agency. It has a geographic and political locus in a polity, be it a city, region, province, or state. The institution of spatial planning is not just the designated government planning agency. Nor is it just the executive branch of government containing that agency. Instead, spatial planning is a multiorganizational construct spanning several spatial scales. The planning institution’s structures include all relevant agencies at each level of government, plus nongovernmental stakeholders, and it is embodied in the concept and practice of governance. The institution, in addition to these organizational structures, entails both formal and informal processes and procedures.

Codified laws such as plan making, zoning, reviewing development proposals, financing capital facilities, and assessing environmental impacts represent the formal side of institutional processes. The informal side includes customs and traditions that are not codified in law (Cheema & Rondinelli, 2007; Eymeri-Douzans & Pierre, 2010; Healey, 2007). The institution also embodies the substantive content that encodes the norms of the planning institution, such as plans, goals, and objectives. Content is also expressed in symbols and images, both visual (logos, plans, maps, designs) and verbal (metaphors, mottos, slogans, stories).

As the scope of governance expands to the megacity region and beyond, planning practice scatters across disciplines, sectors, interests, and scales (Gualini, 2004; Innes, Booher, & Di Vittorio, 2011; Neuman & Hull, 2011; Ross, 2009). This places a premium on consensus building and institutional design (Alexander, 2009; Hopkins & Alexander, 2009). As complexity, chaos, and fuzzy reasoning entered theory, they called into question the effectiveness of the planning enterprise (Christensen, 1999; de Roo & Porter, 2007; Haughton, Allmendinger, Counsell, & Vigar, 2010; Healey, 2007; Innes & Booher, 2010).

Reflective theorists who observed practice closely have noted that under a qualified set of conditions and a limited set of expectations for effective outcomes (as measured by the actual improvement of place), collaboration and consensus-building can enhance civic and institutional capacity and deliberative democracy (Forester, 1999; Hajer & Wagenaar, 2003; Healey, 2006; Innes & Booher, 2010; Throgmorton, 1996). Said in another way, as urban space and its planning got messier, their outcomes became sketchier, a finding confirmed by Downs (2005).

Studies have begun to note the relationships between images of place and urban planning. In Flanders, Albrechts (1999) identified how a new law and a new institution were created as a result of the specific image of the Flemish Diamond. Faludi (1996) showed general and theoretical aspects of this relation, stressing a strategic approach framed by powerful images. Neuman (1996) revealed the role of images of place in creating institutions using planning. Abbott (1996) highlighted the changing nature of the downtown in American cities. This approach was described as “the development of spatial logic and metaphors that can command attention and carry persuasive power in complex political contexts” (Albrechts, Healey, & Kunzmann, 2003, p. 127). Images of place routinely appear in urban plans, which form the heart of the planning enterprise and comprise its institutional soul (Neuman, 1998). A comparable construct, the “spatial imaginary” (Hage, 1996, p. 463), is often used in human or cultural geography. Images and plans capture the essence (content) of the planning institution.

Lifecycle Theory of Institutional Evolution

My research addresses Parson’s (1990) call for a theory of the dynamics of institutional change. The literature review identified two elements often absent from institutional research. One element comprises the cognitive factors of the institution, which encompass its content, and the image that expresses that content. The other element is the institutional lifecycle. Lifecycle theory spans the gaps among competing theories of institutional evolution (incremental structuration, radical revolt, and institutional design), while incorporating lifecycle endpoints of creation and demise. Their synthesis is a cognitive lifecycle theory of institutional change.

The lifecycle theory this article proposes is based on a typology of institutional evolution that identifies five phases in the institution’s lifecycle: creation, development, reform, decline, and demise (the rows in Table 1). The model of institutional transformation identifies four variables: type of change, stimulus for the change, image constituting the
institution, and outcome of the transformation (the columns in Table 1). Not all institutions necessarily undergo all the phases indicated by this schema; nor do they undergo them in this or any other particular chronological sequence. For example, rather than dying, most institutions become more extended over time and space. Some undergo multiple episodes of expansion and contraction. The theoretical model provides a general conceptual framework and offers a set of testable hypotheses.

The variable type of institutional change encompasses five types. One type is creation: Change may be decreed by an act of political will and institutional design. It may be created by a revolution or social movement. The second type of change may be through gradual evolution. The third type of change may occur by reform, a non-incremental jump. The fourth type is degradation or destructuring. Finally there is demise, which can be planned or be the result of natural extinction.

Table 1. The lifecycle theory of institutional transformation.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type of change</th>
<th>Stimulus for change</th>
<th>Change to constituting image</th>
<th>Outcome of change</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Creation</td>
<td>Dissatisfaction with status quo</td>
<td>New image</td>
<td>New institution</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Evolution: Incremental change</td>
<td>No stimulus, or stimulus to maintain or improve slightly</td>
<td>Maintain existing image stability</td>
<td>Stability within existing societal frame</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reform: Major change</td>
<td>Internal or external recognition that major conditions are changing, thus institution must too</td>
<td>New image coexists and/or competes with existing image, and may replace it</td>
<td>Stability-preserving change within new societal conditions, or instability (unintended result)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Decline/destructuring</td>
<td>Internal disregard, external threat</td>
<td>Decline of faith in existing image</td>
<td>Atrophy, decline</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Demise</td>
<td>External threat, internal disregard</td>
<td>No image, loss of image</td>
<td>Extinction</td>
</tr>
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</table>

Institutions and their development and evolution have a cognitive basis in addition to a social basis. These ideas are developed in the next section.

The Image and the Institutional Lifecycle

We can think of an institution as an instrument of power that maintains order in accordance with an idea. This idea organizes people and resources around itself and thus institutionalizes the idea. As the idea collapses, the institution formed around it also collapses.

Images give visual shape to these ideas. They spark the imagination and become a symbolic rallying point for the action and agency that sustain the institution. Cognitive theories suggest that the mental image in the mind’s eye needs to be changed in order for a new idea to be accepted (Boulding, 1956). In favorable circumstances, this new idea eventually becomes the image that a new institution coalesces around. A corollary is that the image needs to stay intact to maintain the continuity of an existing institution. In this way, images play key roles in the entire life of the institution.

One dimension of the constitutional image varies along the institutional lifecycle, from the creation of a new image through stability, reform, decline, displacement, and, finally, loss of the image. I hypothesize that as the constitutional image changes, so does the institution. Creation occurs when a new image is invented or appropriated. Stability refers to a situation in which the image does not change or undergoes only minor change. Replacement is the substitution of a new image for an old one. Decline occurs when the image is becoming less relevant vis-à-vis
its context. Displacement describes the complete and rapid substitution of one image for another, with the new image being swept in by a radical change or revolution. The loss of a constitutional image occurs when the institution ceases to exist. If the image does not match the institution in its phase of change, a contradiction between them occurs, which may lead to a crisis in the constitutional image and the institution itself.

The second dimension of the constitutional image combines image strength and clarity into a composite value I call degree of imageability. The word “imageable” is taken from Lynch (1960) and used in that sense. It refers to the degree to which an external or visible image can be seen as a mental image. An image can be clear and strong and thus have a high degree of imageability. It can conversely be weak and ambiguous and thus have a low degree of imageability.

Powerful images shape events (Boorstin, 1962). Image handlers have risen to the highest levels of confidence and influence in politics. When the image is married to words, the two reinforce each other, both becoming more powerful (Burnett, 2004).

Images have power because of the roles that they play in the mind, because they saturate the media, because they are malleable and transportable, and because they are widely accepted currency. Moreover, images exert power because, like money, they transcend boundaries due to their nature as currency. Both are universal media. Images cross social, political, economic, disciplinary, and ideological boundaries.

The boundary-dissolving property of images endows them with the capacity to carry out the governance of growth management by supplementing and strengthening traditional means of coordination. A coordination strategy based on the image, especially the plan image, enhances coordination processes and structures, whether formal or informal. Images are a cohering logic that can be used (and abused) to carry out the complex task of coordination among the myriad partners that plan a city region.

The interrelationship of the image and the lifecycle reveals their dual nature: Images sustain institutions and project them into larger society; at the same time, institutions maintain and project their constituting image. The same dual nature can just as easily change or topple an institution, and change or erase the constituting image.

Practitioner-theorist Aldo Rossi (1982) closed his influential book The Architecture of the City with the observation that the politics of the city cannot be separated from the planning and architecture that construct it. His politics was about choices. “Who ultimately chooses the image of a city if not the city itself—and always and only through its political institutions” (p. 162).

The case study of growth management in Madrid, Spain, captured in four episodes below, takes up Rossi’s thesis as well as Lynch’s (1960) pioneering study by examining the role of images in city planning, and in the formation and evolution of governance institutions. The longitudinal analysis, which spans four generations across one century, allows for the assessment of changes in several variables over time, including the image (independent variable) and institution (dependent variable).

### The Evolution of City and Metropolitan Planning in Madrid

This research analyzes four planning episodes in order to answer questions about how city and metropolitan plans and strategies were made and how the institution of metropolitan planning evolved. The term “planning episode” is borrowed from Bolan (1980). My use of the term differs in that my time frames are longer than Bolan’s. I understand each planning episode as a planning cycle of about 5 to 10 years, the time it took to conceive and prepare a plan and take the first implementation actions after adoption. (Implementation means institutional development and intervention in the territory for which it is planned.)

The episodes are analyzed as individual case histories from the modern era of Spanish urban planning. In each episode, the independent variable is the image of the future of the city (before 1940) or metropolis (after 1940) as depicted in official city and metropolitan plans and strategies. The image is analyzed to determine the change that it undergoes, its clarity and strength (imageability), and the degree to which it encapsulates the institution’s content.

The dependent variable (the mode of change to the city/metropolitan planning institution) is analyzed to identify a) the stage in the institution’s lifecycle, b) the institution’s overall stability, c) the importance of the planning institution within the political regime, and d) the institution’s administrative structures, planning processes, and thematic content. (See Appendix Tables A1, A2, and A3 for research variables and hypotheses.)

This research design allows us to assess the relationship between the image and the institution against a wide array of intervening variables, each of which changed markedly across the five planning episodes. It demonstrates how the images and the institution coevolved in the face of the historical flux of dictators who rose and fell, democracies that waxed and waned, planners and other leaders who came and went, political parties that appeared and disappeared, and planning bureaucracies that made heads roll and pushed paper.
Impotent Images, Impotent Practice: Planning Without Politics 1910–1931

The first episode extends from 1910 to 1931. Several plans were sketched but none were adopted. In this period there were rapid changes between regimes at both the national and city levels, resulting in a low priority for planning. The independent variable is the lack of strong images in these draft plans, none of which enjoyed political backing. The dependent variable is the succession of ineffectual city planning organizations. The intervening variables are the shifts among political regimes (monarchy, democracy, dictatorship), the fragmented and weak government structure, the lack of influence of city plans, the lack of a leader in city planning, and party politics that was product and prisoner of the shifts among regimes. In this episode, the intervening variables had a greater impact on city planning than the image, at least partly because the plan images were weak.

The first of the four plans of the era was the 1910 Proyecto para la Urbanización del Extrarradio. It became known as the Nuñez Granés Plan, after its author, the engineer Pedro Nuñez Granés. Its proposal dealt with the extrarradio, which can be translated as the periphery outside the limits of the city. The plan responded to the proliferation of housing construction in the extrarradio. The 1910 plan was the first to adumbrate the concept of metropolitan Madrid. Nuñez Granés’s conception of the metropolis reflected the problematic nature of his time. Madrid’s metropolitan form was diffuse and anarchic around the edges. The most pressing question was the extrarradio, the outskirts. Yet, the urban problematic indicated by the terms metropolis and extrarradio was never articulated graphically. Nuñez Granés never drew an image that captured the dilemma that was confronting Madrid: whether to grow up (vertically) in the center or to grow out in the exurbs. The term extrarradio is vague, connoting “something out there.” Being beyond the outer edge of town made it the quintessential nonplace.

Because the Nuñez Granés Plan focused on the outskirts, it attracted little attention upon publication. The plan map’s small scale and muted tones were no match for the large-scale plan map and bold relief of the grid in the 1860 Expansion Plan (not discussed here), the sole prior referent for a Madrid city plan.

In 1923, the Junta Consultiva Municipal de Obras (Municipal Works Advisory Board) put forward another proposal, which was neither adopted nor implemented. In 1926, Nuñez Granés, then the city engineer, put forward yet another plan, which also was neither adopted nor implemented. The city sponsored an international competition for a new plan in 1929. The competition was declared void by the jury because no entry fulfilled all the requirements, though one proposal by architects Zuazo and Jansen went on to influence plans more than a decade hence. The Plan General de Extensión was the last of the plans of this period that was not implemented. It was drafted in 1931 by city architect José de Lorite Kramer. It borrowed most of its content from the Zuazo–Jansen proposal and, to a lesser extent, from the two earlier Nuñez Granés plans.

This period, from 1910 to 1931, saw the gradual evolution of the city planning institution and the stirrings of metropolitan planning. The old image of the capital that was really just a town (Villa y Corte) was variously but never convincingly replaced by a succession of vague and never-adopted plans. The stimuli for these changes were a series of changes in political regimes (republic, dictatorship, monarchy), and the outcomes were several attempts at municipal and incipient metropolitan planning, none of which were adopted or implemented.

Gran Madrid: High on Hierarchy 1939–1960

In this period, a strong new image of the city of Madrid, Great Madrid, and a new plan to realize it led to the formation of a new metropolitan planning organization. It was Madrid’s first at the metro scale. These events took place within a societal framework of revolution. General Franco’s troops had just won the civil war and his 35-year dictatorship had just begun.

The Bidagor Plan (named for architect-planner Pedro Bidagor) was drafted in 1939 and adopted in 1946. The historical context begins with the landmark 1929 planning scheme by Zuazo–Jansen and the all-important civil war of 1936 to 1939. The analysis extends to the 1956 national planning law sired by Bidagor. This law codified the principles and institutions begat by his 1946 plan. The key organizing principle, both spatially and institutionally, was hierarchy.

During this period, the all-powerful Comisaría de Urbanismo (City Planning Commissariat) and its commanding centralized bureaucracy and hierarchical structure were put to effective use by a highly influential planner in the person of Pedro Bidagor, and the omnipotent falange of Franco. Bidagor prepared the Plan General de Ordenación Urbana, better known as the Bidagor Plan. Diverging from the historical tendency of plans in Madrid, which reacted to growth, Bidagor’s plan reacted to a diseconomy: the destruction of Madrid during Spain’s civil war.
Equal to hierarchy in importance was the plan’s emphasis on Great Madrid, Imperial Madrid, and \textit{capitalidad}, which highlights Madrid’s role as Spain’s capital by emphasizing monumentality and gateways. In the plan, land use was classified according to its capacity for development: urban, urban reserve, and rural. Plans were hierarchized according to scale: general (for the entire city), partial (for specific zones), and project (for construction). There existed a hierarchical chain of approval of projects and plans.

The City Planning Commission under Bidagor was dependent on the Comisión de Urbanismo, an organ of the \textit{Ministerio de la Gobernación} (Ministry of Governing), which was the ministry closest to Franco. This ministry was responsible for the coordination and control of government. The Comisión created two institutional innovations. One was the cycle of preparing a plan, the plan’s subsequent adoption by law, and the implementation of the plan by a new organization created by the law.

The other innovation, which came a decade later, was the first national planning law. It was adopted in 1956 after more than five years of drafts and debates. The \textit{Ley del Suelo y Ordenación Urbana} (The Land and City Planning Law) standardized hierarchical planning for all levels of government for the entire country. A far-reaching and comprehensive law, it drew on the precepts of the Bidagor plan and its implementing law. These included tripartite land classification (urban, urban reserve, rural), tripartite plan classification (general, partial, project), mandate from above, approval and subrogation by higher levels of authority, direct public intervention on the land, and detailed oversight, among others. This was not surprising, as Bidagor was the key architect behind the law. Its impact was so great that the 1992 national \textit{Ley del Suelo} maintained its main features, as did the \textit{Comunidad Autónoma de Madrid’s} (Madrid Regional Government) mid-1990s regional planning law. Thus, as predicted, the plan and the laws it inspired sowed seeds in very fertile soil, forming a local and national city planning consciousness (Comisión General de Ordenación Urbana de Madrid y sus Alrededores [General Commissariat for City Planning for Madrid and its Environs], 1953).

The overall approach during this period followed a formula: No political support and no image yield no plan adoption and no new institution. No one seemed to learn this better than Pedro Bidagor. The image of metropolitan space in the plan, and the metaphors of the plan (Gran Madrid, Imperial Madrid) were the images that formed the bedrock of the planning and governance institutions. The new institution was the \textit{Comisión General de Ordenación Urbana de Madrid}, whose constituting image was Great Madrid and its capitalidad, its nature as the great capital of a great nation, replete with the monuments and boulevards befitting such a capital. The stimulus for this change was to project the new dictator’s power.

### The Long Fall: Demise of Technocracy 1960–1980

The third episode starts in 1960, at the outset of the process to prepare a new metropolitan growth management plan. The same central government-controlled metropolitan planning agency, the \textit{Comisión General de Ordenación Urbana de Madrid y sus Alrededores}, initiated this plan, which was published in 1961 and adopted by law in 1963. The Comisión’s plan lacked three key ingredients that the 1946 plan had: a strong and clear image, a strong individual planner, and political backing. It is in this sense a counter-example to the 1940s and 1980s episodes. While the plan’s development and its attempted adoption took place in the 1960s, the analysis extends to 1980 in order to cover the rise of the important citizen movement and the transition to democracy, and the simultaneous downfall of the metropolitan planning agency called COPLACO, the \textit{Comisión de Planeamiento y Coordinación del Área Metropolitana de Madrid} (Madrid Metropolitan Area Planning and Coordination Commission).

In the 1960s, the Franco regime was at the onset of its decline, and so the centralized and hierarchical planning institution began to be out of step with its times. The technical, directive, and mandatory planning processes prescribed by law went unfulfilled by weak individual planning leadership. This problematic institutional and political situation was complicated by the declining influence of one faction in Franco’s regime (the falange) in the early 1960s, and the concomitant rise of another, the Opus Dei. The latter part of this period (the mid- and late 1970s) is erratic and unstable vis-à-vis political regimes and political parties, as local politics and planning were dominated by the citizens’ movement and numerous nascent political parties. Many revisions and replacements to the 1963 plan were attempted throughout this period. None came to fruition.

The weak image in the 1963 plan was not strong enough to lead planning through the wreckage of the crumbling dictatorship. The weakness of the image and thus of the plan (and by extension the entire planning program of the new agency COPLACO), left COPLACO lurching in a series of planning and political crises that led to its demise in 1982.

In 1961 the \textit{Comisión General de Ordenación Urbana de Madrid y sus Alrededores} published the \textit{Plan General de Ordenación Urbana del Área Metropolitana de Madrid},
“a weak imitation without conviction of the 1941 plan,” according to the architect Rafael Moneo (Moneo, 1967). It reacted to rapid growth due to immigration. The influx into Madrid, particularly its southern suburbs, was to continue through the 1960s and 1970s. The plan continued the ineffective decongestion and decentralization policies of its 1946 predecessor and relied on the same conceptual underpinning. Despite being prepared by the same planning agency, it had less political clout. The regime now had a strong pro-development stance, with less enthusiasm for regulating urban growth. The Comisaría, now that it was in the Ministry of Housing instead of the Ministry of Governing, was no longer near the center of power.

This metro plan presented visions at three scales: region, metropolis, and city. The region encompassed six provinces out to a radius of 125 kilometers. The metropolis included Madrid and 15 surrounding towns. The two larger scales were treated sketchily, and their provisions were never implemented, nor did they influence planning or development in outer areas. Multiple visions, rather than a single image, diluted the plan’s message. The statutory incapacity of the plan’s enforcement outside the city limits, despite the word metropolitan in its title and its preparation by a central government agency, made the plan a city plan by default.

In the late 1960s, three new realities emerged. These changes marked the beginning of the end of the Franquist era and the start of the transition to democracy. Their effects were felt in metropolitan planning until the early 1980s. The first change was the well-documented citizens movement. The second was the realization that hierarchical institutions no longer corresponded to political and social realities (owing to the grassroots movement). Last, the plan’s hub-and-spoke spatial model of the region no longer corresponded to actual patterns of growth. COPLACO later admitted these failings.

Between 1960 and 1981, the core of the Madrid metro area nearly doubled in population, exploding from 2,384,000 to 4,441,000 inhabitants (Leal Maldonado, 1987). Like other expanding metropolitan regions, Madrid faced the problems of rapid growth and urban sprawl, and their associated impacts. Some effects were considered good, such as cultural diversity, economic opportunity, and enhanced lifestyle options. Others, like lack of adequate and affordable housing, congestion, pollution, loss of open space, inequitable distribution of economic growth, and loss of community identity were seen as ills attending growth.

COPLACO died a slow and painful death in the 1970s and early 1980s. Because it was an entity of central government, its downfall was its stubborn refusal to face the music of the democratic decentralization brought on by the powerful citizens movement of the 1970s (Castells, 1981, 1983) and the transition to democratic government after Franco. COPLACO’s rigidity in the face of change was the nail in its coffin.

In summary, this period saw the creation of a new institution (COPLACO) to replace the demise of the old one (Comisaría). The old image of the centralized institution and a central capital city was replaced by a weak and vague vision of metropolitan Madrid. The stimulus for this change was the rapid development of the metro area as a result of rural to urban migration to support economic growth; and the outcome was a revised metro plan and a new metro planning institution.

An Institution is (Re)Born 1983–2000

COPLACO was dissolved in 1983 with the onset of the new regional government called the Comunidad Autónoma de Madrid. The new region was composed of the former province of Madrid, which had 178 municipal corporations, compared to 27 municipalities in the COPLACO jurisdiction. During the 1980s, Madrid’s growth abated, and it resumed in the 1990s and 2000s. According to the Instituto Nacional de Estadísticas (National Institute of Statistics) 2010 official estimates, the city of Madrid’s population was 3,273,049, and the greater metro region’s was 6,458,684.

By the mid- and late 1980s, Spain was well into consolidating its democratic government, which came into being after longtime dictator Francisco Franco died in 1975. The region was constituted in 1983 by the new national constitution, and was searching for an identity. Madrid was an odd case of regional identity in that it was manufactured politically, sliced out of the heart of old Castile. Prior to 1983, it had no regional identity. In response, the Comunidad de Madrid’s regional planning department prepared two key strategies, each containing a key image. One image was for the region, which it called Madrid Región Metropolitana. The other was for the southern subregion, the Gran Sur (Great South). Madrid Región Metropolitana was the principal strategy used to construct the missing regional identity.4

This new image of the region was used explicitly to shape and implement an electoral campaign strategy, which the planners saw as a priori to crafting a regional growth management strategy. The strategy and its image were used to reform the pre-existing institution of metro planning in the context of a stabilizing political, economic, and institutional environment.
Characteristics of the new government, inherited from a long Spanish tradition, were hierarchy, centralized structure (though to a lesser degree than under the preceding dictatorship), and a technical–political planning process. The new government benefitted from the strong individual leadership of the planning department director and the regional government president (in the 1980s), and from the strength of the same political party that controlled the central and regional governments and the municipalities in the zone of the Gran Sur strategy. This episode concluded in the mid-1990s with the formulation of the new regional planning law and the draft Regional Plan of Territorial Strategy.

In 1984, the regional planning department COTMAV (Department of Regional Planning, Environment, and Housing) drafted two laws to carry out its mission, both of which were adopted by the regional government. The first was Ley 4/1984 del 10 de febrero de 1984, sobre Medidas de Disciplina Urbanística (Law for Measures for City Planning Practice). It was to guide local planning. It contained detailed land use, development, and building regulations. Another aim of the law was to build the internal capacity of municipalities to plan and control development. The second law was the Ley 10/1984 del 30 de mayo de 1984, sobre Ordenación Territorial (Law for Regional Planning). It was intended to guide regional growth management.

Eduardo Mangada, then director of regional planning, regrouped after a major political setback by exerting a greater personal presence in policy formulation and by forming the Oficina de Planeamiento Territorial (Office of Territorial Planning, the growth management office) inside his department. He stacked it with many of the best planners Madrid had to offer. Their orders: to create strategy that would shape the politics that would shape Madrid, and thus shape planning.

Mangada and the Office of Territorial Planning strategically narrowed their sights on a few strategic tasks. One was to write the centerpiece of the reelection campaign platform called Madrid Región Metropolitana for the Federación Socialista Madrileña, the governing party in regional government. Another was to rethink the region’s public intervention strategy. It set about drafting growth strategies for three subregional zones outside of the city. Finally, it worked on regional planning directives called directrices.

In 1987, Mangada (an architect by training, as were most Spanish planners) and his team responded to these challenges. They devised a political strategy called Madrid Región Metropolitana with four aims: to serve as a political election strategy, to confer regional identity, to build the institutions of planning and regional government, and to craft a regional planning policy to govern land use and public intervention. Its rhetoric reflected the globalization of the world economy, Spain’s increased incorporation into it, the drive to compete economically at the international level, and Madrid’s desire to reassert itself as a great European capital. Bolstering the region’s (and party’s) image on a variety of levels was a key goal of the strategy, a political strategy that chose territorial planning to execute it (Federación Socialista Madrileña, 1987).

Mangada’s and the Office of Territorial Planning’s achievement came in the form of Madrid Región Metropolitana, specifically, the Gran Sur project. Apart from its broader political intentions (mentioned previously), the strategy had another regional planning objective: “to make the Comunidad de Madrid an integrated, efficient and equitable region. The compatibility of equity and efficiency requires in our context correcting the free functioning of the market with regional planning, economic and social policies” (Consejería de Política Territorial, 1991b, p. 4). Integration meant forming a coherent unit of the new territory of the region of Madrid. Equitability meant balancing the long-standing territorial imbalance between the rich north and west with the poor south and southeast. Another clear emphasis was to support the proper working of the regional economy.

The strategy took shape in two ways. First was the overall regional vision, presented in three working documents detailing the specific projects to realize the strategy, and a final document synthesizing them. Second were three zonal strategies for the eastern, western, and southern sectors of the metro area. The overall and zonal strategies were implemented via three methods: regional infrastructure investments, development projects carried out by ARPEGIO, S.A. (a regional government development authority), and agreements between regional government and local municipalities to coordinate implementation of the zonal strategies (Consejería de Política Territorial, 1988, 1989a, 1989b, 1990a, 1990b, 1991a, 1991b).

Madrid Región Metropolitana was a success and it led to the regional government being reelected by a wide margin. The platform was key to victory. Its proposition: Govern the region. Governing the region meant first giving it an identity. The title tells it all: Madrid Región Metropolitana. Madrid was no longer just the city. All of government, spurred by the Department of Territorial Policy (the Consejería), strived to create a regional culture, a way of thinking about this new political creature, the Comunidad de Madrid.

What enabled the Regional Planning Department to proceed confidently was its role in the reelection and the identification of the regional planning program as a political program with full political support. Madrid Región
Metropolitana became the umbrella for all regional planning. Priority was given to the zonal strategies because they best fit the new posture of aggressive public intervention the Consejería displayed. Realizing them would leave tangible and lasting marks on the region, something unseen in Madrid’s planning since the 1940s and 1950s.

Madrid touched the future with new images for the Gran Sur and the Madrid Región Metropolitana. The regional government, the southern cities, and now the populace at large are following them. The images (and, here, I refer to both mental and design images) were the glue that bound the participants to the planning processes and held the processes together. They facilitated political accords because beneficiaries could see what they were getting.

Eduardo Mangada baldly exposed the intent of the Madrid Región Metropolitana and Gran Sur strategies and their place in regional politics and institution building:

It seems important the idea of the need to create or recompose a physical image as a support for a political message, as a means of co-opting the commitment of the different interest groups in a territorial project. In the case of Madrid this convenience turned into a necessity for the recently born Regional Government, since, in large measure, Madrid “Metropolitan Region” is an artificial act, that is to say a political act. The Autonomous Region appears as cheese stuck in a sandwich between the [Madrid] City Hall and the omnipresent Central Government. Only the invention of a supramunicipal territory, the formulation of a desirable image and the commitment in its construction could give legitimacy and identity to the Regional Government, and awaken the feeling of belonging in the citizens. For this the effort was made to construct a political discourse and invent a new territory, part of which is the piece called “Gran Sur.” (personal communication, July 17, 1994)

As in any complex phenomena, no one factor, not even the image, made or broke the Madrid Región Metropolitana or the Gran Sur strategies. Their successes resulted from the favorable conjunction of many factors. It was an evolving accumulation of ideas and agreements that not only got the project underway, but also changed the way planning was done, thereby building new institutions of regional planning and regional government.

The period beginning in 1983 saw the creation of a new institution (COTMAY) to replace the old one (COPLACO). The old images of the centralized institution and the central capital city were replaced by a polycentric vision of metropolitan Madrid. The stimulus for this change was the fall of the Franco dictatorship, and the outcome was a territorial strategy and a revived regional planning institution.

Empirical Findings and Analysis

What follows is a set of findings that synthesizes the episodic and institutional history of planning in Madrid over the 20th century. These are not the only findings regarding Madrid’s planning over that time, just those that emerged from the present analysis, based on a specific research design intended to test several hypotheses based on a theory of institutional evolution. A more extended discussion explaining these findings follows. Implications for planning, in bold and in italics, are listed for each of them.

1. Madrid has undergone a city planning cycle in which a plan was prepared, adopted by law, and implemented by a new institution every 20 years or so since 1910 (save adoption in the 1910–1931 cycle). This preparation–adoption–institutionalization sequence, the planning institution’s structures, and technical-political processes persisted, with some exceptions, despite frequent upheavals in society. These upheavals included revolutions, civil wars, and regime changes among dictatorship, monarchy, and democracy. The city planning institution played a lead role in maintaining continuity, traumatic history notwithstanding.

2. Politicians used city and metropolitan planning as a political strategy to build the institutions of metropolitan and regional planning and governance. This strategy inaugurated a shift in the mode of city planning. Formerly, planning was a process of government acting directly on the land (territory) through master plans, regulations, and investments in infrastructure. Now, spatial planning is an institutionalized process of government acting on other governments and organized interests through image-based plan making and strategy forming.

3. Planners in turn used the images that they invented for the city, metropolis, and region to build new and better planning institutions. These images were physical designs of the city, of the whole metropolitan region, and of parts of it. They were also metaphors capturing new visions of the city. These images were most often presented in spatial plans. Recently, they have appeared in regional development strategies and reelection strategies. The prominence of the image can be attributed to its inherent power and its nature as the tool of habitual recourse for the designers of these
institutions, who are architects by profession. Plan images that posited new identities for the growing metropolis included Great Madrid, the Madrid Metropolitan Region, and the Great South. This iterative process, repeated every 20 or so years, led to the gradual and incremental improvement of the overall planning institution, which in some cases evolved in major jumps instead of gradual increments. Images of place contained in plans and strategies became the cornerstones of the preparation–adoption–institutionalization cycle.

4. Plan images were tools that coordinated growth management planning and urban policy. In a complex, fragmented institutional milieu in which scores of organized interests competed in overlapping policy arenas, images were a cohesive force around which plans and policies were shaped through consensus building and deliberation. Policy negotiation based on images complemented procedural coordination methods that sought to organize the members of the overall planning institution via a set of planning processes. Images provided the basis for coordination.

5. Each plan or strategy and its images of the future marked a new period of Madrid’s planning institution’s history. These imagined metropolises were at the heart of the dialectic of institutional evolution: Images had the dual capacity to sustain the institution across time and space and to inspire changes to it. In the dynamics of institutional change, images shaped individuals’ cognition and the institution’s structuration. An image endowed with this capacity to sustain and change institutions, by embodying its essential norms and by constituting the structures and processes that shape the institution, is called the constitutional image. Constitutional images help constitute, shape, and identify their institutions.

6. The institutional structure of urban planning and its governance is rooted in images of urban form that extend back several generations. The framework supporting the structure of this institution is a legal one. The national and regional planning laws are two cornerstones. The current versions of both are founded on the 1956 national planning statute, even in view of the many changes that occurred in the intervening decades. The 1956 law contained some provisions adapted from other countries’ statutes. However, it was primarily based on the 1946 law for Madrid and the plan that the 1946 law adopted—its an updated version of the 1929 Zuazo–Jansen proposal. They manifested in a European context the profound institutional implications of Daniel Burnham’s words: “Make no little plans. They have no magic to stir men’s blood and probably themselves will not be realized. Make big plans; aim high in hope and work, remembering that a noble, logical diagram once recorded will never die, but long after we are gone will be a living thing, asserting itself with ever-growing insistency” (Hall, 1996, p. 174). The clarity of the original plan images was the driving force in institutional evolution and stability.

Plans have historically determined the structure of the Madrid planning institution. The organizations and procedures were devised afterward, to implement and revise the plans. In Madrid, the plan is the heart of the institution. The plan carries much weight in public policy and discourse, and it is laden with political symbolism. The plan matters. This has been particularly true for the city and for the region during the Mangada era.

Hierarchy remains the main characteristic of the planning institution’s structure. A hierarchy is vertical, top-down, one-way, directive, and rigid. The national and regional laws permitted some openings in its vertical structures for relations among entities at the same level, and among sectoral interests outside of government, through a consensus process called concertación.

The escape valves to the top-heavy hierarchy were informal processes in which extensive networking dissolved boundaries both upward and downward. The networks that circumscribed the patterns of informal relations, together with the images that kept those networks together, prevented the legal structure from toppling altogether. Just as nature abhors a vacuum, Madrid’s planning institutions needed to resist rigidity if they wanted to stay alive. The health of growth management in Madrid was a testament to the flexible relief that improvised informal interactions gave, and still give (see Table 2).

The Plan Image

New political regimes injected their values into the institutional machinery, conveniently packaged in an image. In Madrid, the spatial plan is a meaningful document, an effective instrument of urban policy. Its content, at least on the rhetorical level, is known to all. For example, the 1985 Madrid General Plan’s slogan, “Recuperar Madrid,” was widely cited and quoted. In the 1980s, the Consejería’s twin strategies, Great South and Madrid Metropolitan Region, introduced, via their imagery, the socialist party’s values of social equity and equitable spatial distribution of growth into the planning vocabulary. Franco’s Great Madrid imposed the falangist values of nationalism, patriarchy, hierarchy, and
capitalidad on a city eager to heal its wounds after a bloody civil war. As publicists, marketers, and agents know too well, it is the image that sells. Madrid’s planners learned this lesson early. The image rules the plan and the planning institution.

Thus, a special place has to be set aside for the plan image. The image was at the heart of plan making and institution building in Madrid. A good image was able to present a range of ideas in ways that words could not. Planning images embodied more than just a technical-political proposal for the future; they captured the social context around the proposal and infused it into the image, thus making it understandable to its constituency. In this way, good images packaged visual, psychological, and social factors. According to Jung (1982), “the term ‘image’ is intended to express not only the form of the activity taking place, but the typical situation in which the activity is released” (p. 106). An image is a construct that includes not just what we see with our eyes (an external image, per Boulding, 1956), or even with our mind’s eye (internal image). Activities and settings are also attached to it. Images are not isolated forms.

Planners recognized certain practices as givens in Madrilenian planning. They proceeded with surety, confidently crafting images without the need for extensive debate and negotiation. They transcended quarrels among political parties. An example in Madrid that has spanned centuries is the historic city center. “From the president to the porter of the last apartment house believe in the need to restore the city center” (personal communication, J. M. de la Riva, March 24, 1994).

Other persistent themes are centrality, capitalidad, and economic growth. In plans, these themes have been recorded in diagrams and maps, in city and regional designs, in urban design projects, and in text. The most persistent strategies to attain the plans’ visions were renovating the city center, accessing the center using a radial pattern of roads and rail, decongesting the center, growing
to the north, and developing satellite towns and green belts. All of these strategies were packaged in a regional design of settlements connected by transport networks and buffered by natural environs.

Over the 20th century, the role of the planners was to create the image. The planners used design-based plans and strategies to build successive incarnations of the metropolitan planning institution: the 1941 Bidagor plan and its Comisaría, the 1961 plan and COPLACO, the 1987 strategy Madrid Región Metropolitana, and the Consejería. The planners used the image to catalyze planning processes and to attain agreement. As the processes recurred over decades and generations, the planners built up the intellectual heritage of their institution: its planning doctrine (see Table 3).

**Images Inform a Cognitive Theory of Institutional Evolution**

The internal image in the mind’s eye is an emergent phenomenon that is constructed by neural processing. This process is central to cognition (Finkel, 1992). The image is socially constructed, given meaning through social, epistemological, and psychological explanations of these neural processes (Berger & Luckmann, 1966; Jung, 1982; Kuhn, 1962). Institutions are also social constructs. I present below a theory that links the image to the institution, through cognition, throughout the institution’s lifecycle.

The basis of this theory is an evolutionary view of institutional change. In this view, institutions progress through a lifecycle from birth to death or complete rebirth, phoenix-like. Table 1 identifies five types of institutional change, with each type corresponding to a stage in the institutional lifecycle.

The first stage in the institutional cycle is creation. The institution may be constituted by an act of political will and institutional design. In this analysis, newly constituted institutions were the 1946 Comisaría General de Ordenación Urbana and the 1983 Comunidad Autónoma de Madrid. This first type of change also may be incited by a revolution or social movement. This is exemplified by the 1939 Junta de Reconstrucción (Reconstruction Council) and the 1970s Movimiento Ciudadano (Citizens Movement).


<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Plan</th>
<th>Capitalidad</th>
<th>Urban renewal</th>
<th>Zoning</th>
<th>Radial accesses into the center</th>
<th>Expand</th>
<th>Decongestion of the center</th>
<th>Satellite new towns</th>
<th>Ring roads</th>
<th>Green belt</th>
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<td>1909 Núñez Granés</td>
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<td>1931 Zuazo–Jansen</td>
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<td>1939 Lorite Kramer</td>
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<td>1939 Paz Maroto</td>
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<td>1939 CRRSM</td>
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<td>1941 Bidagor</td>
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<td>1963 Metropolitan</td>
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<td>1985 Madrid City</td>
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<td>1993 draft Madrid City</td>
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<td>x</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>x</td>
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<tr>
<td>1994 Comunidad de Madrid</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>Zonas de Interés Regional</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>Areas of new centrality, ZIR</td>
<td>x</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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Notes: ZIR = Zona de Interés Regional (Zone of Regional Interest).
a. The nature of Madrid as Spain’s capital, emphasizing monumentality, gateways.
This type of institutional change stems from a profound dissatisfaction with the status quo and a concomitant desire for something new to replace it. The something new is encapsulated by a new image, and a new institution is eventually formed around the values captured by that image.

The second type of institutional change is through gradual evolution, represented by the 1910s and 1920s, the 1950s Comisaría, and the 1960s COPLACO. There is no internal or external stimulus for change and thus the institution maintains itself in the context of a relatively stable society. There may be stimuli that inspire members of the institution to improve it slightly. In either case, the institution maintains its constitutional image because it exists in a stable societal environment.

The third type of change occurs by reform, understood as a nonincremental jump that fully transforms the institution. Examples from Madrid include the 1980s Consejería de Política Territorial strategies Madrid Metropolitan Region and the Great South. In this case, there existed a compelling internal (to the institution) or external recognition that major events were taking place in society that threatened or precipitated a crisis in the institution (i.e., losing the means to reproduce itself, according to Castells’ definition [Castells, personal communication, 1992]). Without a major reform or transformation, the institution risked failing or dying. In this case, a new image may coexist with and compete with the existing constitutional image, until the situation is clarified. The intent of the new image guiding the transformation of the institution is to preserve institutional stability in the context of societal conditions that destabilized the institution.

The fourth type is degradation or destructuring, as evidenced by the 1970s episode of COPLACO, the Comisión de Planificación y Coordinación del Área Metropolitana de Madrid. As the Franco dictatorship crumbled and the grassroots movements led by planners and architects surged, COPLACO collapsed. In this case, the institution did not change with the times, and disregarded and could not cope with the threat that the citizens’ movement imposed. People lost faith in the images that had embodied the Franquist regime, which led to the regime’s eventual collapse. The outcome, until the new democracy created its own images and institutions, was the atrophy of hierarchy.

Finally there is demise, which can be planned or be the result of natural extinction. Two examples of specific institutional demise are the 1963 Comisaría and 1982 COPLACO. The dictatorship’s continuing disregard of the changes in society led to the institutions’ respective collapses. The norms and some of the images associated with the dictatorship, especially hierarchy and centrality, did not fully die out (there was an attempted coup d’état in 1982, and vestiges are still visible in the Popular Party). They have instead been repressed or sublimated to the extent that new institutions were created out of a radically altered set of social conditions and contexts. The new image was of democratic participation, and the new institution was democratic government, more specifically, the new regional government of Madrid and its planning institution, along with the new images created in whole cloth by the planners who led the citizens’ movement.

**Implications for Planning and Institutional Design**

This research places the planning process within the institutional lifecycle. It suggests an appropriate mode of planning for each stage in the lifecycle. Comprehensive planning cannot be done continuously. We cannot make a grand plan to “stir men’s blood,” à la Burnham, at any moment. The institution and society as a whole will not accept it, nor will they act on it. At the same time, planners must not fail when the time is ripe for a new plan. This occurs when coincident social forces conspire to create an entirely new approach, and perhaps a new institution. This suggests that planners pay attention to their institution and its history and current context, so that they can properly situate their practice within it.

In addition to distinguishing the timing for plan making from other more routine aspects of planning, and in addition to the implications for planning practice highlighted in the previous section, these findings imply another role for planning: institutional design. The institutional design role is not a new one. In one form or another, planning is and always has been about the design of new institutions of governance that shape our land and cityscapes. This is true for the city and metropolitan region of Madrid.

Planning in the United States has been a significant agent of political institution formation over the last century, as evidenced by city plans, zoning codes, planning commissions, and the Standard City Planning Enabling Act and Standard State Zoning Enabling Act of the progressive era; the National Resources Planning Board, State Planning Boards, and the Tennessee Valley Authority of the New Deal; the regional associations of government, river basin commissions, state planning programs, metropolitan planning organizations, and the multitude of other single or multiple purpose regional entities of the 1960s and 1970s. These institutions were always formed in times of crisis or radical change.
Planners find themselves once again at a crossroads, where they can lead by intelligently guiding institutional change.

The sequence of image–plan adoption–implementation at the heart of institutional formation and evolution has a long tradition in urban planning, from Cerda’s expansion plan of Barcelona in 1861, through Burnham’s Plan for Chicago in 1909, Abercrombie’s Greater London Plan of the World War II era, to Portland’s metropolitan and New Jersey’s state growth management plans of this era. This list is more than a mere hit parade, however. Each plan planted the seed of institutional change, which planners sowed in close concert with political leaders. This formula for success explicitly acknowledges the political and institutional facets of urban planning. Savvy planners have always known this.

Leaders in planning have long recognized the essential link between planning and democratic government, evidenced in Tugwell’s (1935) *The Battle for Democracy*, Walker’s (1941) *The Planning Function in Urban Government*, and Kent’s (1964) *The Urban General Plan*. Institutional design was implicit in their formulations, and explicit in practice. Institutional design was and is a vital job of planning.

Notes
1. Combining the two general categories of change (gradual and transformational) resembles an institutional version of the punctuated equilibria theory of evolution (Eldredge & Gould, 1972).
2. For an extended discussion, see Neuman (2010).
3. Madrid data collected in situ from 1992 to 2004. All translations from Spanish are by the author.
4. The other regional growth management strategy aggregated seven municipalities in the southern part of the metropolis outside of Madrid city, called the Gran Sur. This strategy was also image based, conceived, and executed by the regional planning agency. It contributed to the development of the theory contained herein, and is documented in Neuman (1996).
5. A pleonasm, since the word region stems from the Latin *regere*, to govern.
6. De la Riva was a Madrid city councilor and secretary general of the Socialist Party in city hall.

References


Table A1. Relation between independent and dependent variables.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Independent variable</th>
<th>Dependent variable</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Change to constitutional image</td>
<td>Imageability</td>
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<tr>
<td>Creation</td>
<td>High</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stability</td>
<td>Medium to high</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Replacement</td>
<td>High (replacing image)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Deterioration</td>
<td>Low</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Displacement</td>
<td>Very high (displacing image)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Very low (displaced image)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Loss</td>
<td>Low to very low</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table A2. Intervening variable dimensions.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>Negative impact on policy</th>
<th>Positive impact on policy</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Stability of political regime</td>
<td>Short term, unstable</td>
<td>Long term, stable</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Structure of planning institution</td>
<td>Decentralized, loosely coupled</td>
<td>Centralized, hierarchical</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Policy making method</td>
<td>Permissive, voluntary</td>
<td>Directive, mandatory</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Individual leadership</td>
<td>Weak</td>
<td>Strong</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Party politics</td>
<td>Weak party, planning is a low priority</td>
<td>Strong party, planning is a high priority</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table A3. Research hypotheses.

- As the constitutional image changes, so does the institution.
- The more rooted a symbol/image is in its society, economy, polity, and culture, then the more it will be used by the institution and the more effective it will be.
- The more imageable an image/symbol is, then the more it will be used in planning, policymaking, and institution building, and the more effective it will be.
- The more deeply content is rooted in the institution, and the more deeply it is rooted in and connected to the currency of ideas and debates in which society is engaged, the more relevance and effectiveness the institution will have.

The contrapositives of these hypotheses are also posited:

- If the institution does not change, then its constitutional image will remain as is.
- The less rooted a symbol/image is in its society, economy, polity, and culture, then the less it will be used by the institution and the less effective it will be.
- The less imageable—that is, the more vague and ambiguous—an image/symbol is, then the less it will be used in planning, policymaking, and institution building and the less effective it will be.
- When an institution is more deeply rooted in structure or process and the less deeply rooted in content, it becomes more transitory and less relevant.